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1.	  Introduction	  
Undoubtedly,	   an	   ambiguous	   figure	   prompts	   a	   phenomenal	   difference	   in	   one’s	   experi-­‐
ence	  of	  it	  insofar	  as	  the	  figure	  undergoes	  a	  Gestalt	  switch,	  i.e.,	  it	  is	  seen	  now	  one	  way,	  
under	   a	   certain	   aspect,	   now	   another	  way,	   under	   another	   aspect.	   For	   sure,	  moreover,	  
this	  phenomenal	  difference	   is	  matched	  by	  a	  different	  description	  of	   such	  experiences:	  
we	  say	  that	  the	  figure	   is	  now	  seen	  as	  a	  certain	  thing,	  now	  seen	  as	  another	  thing.	  Now	  
the	  question	  is,	  does	  this	  phenomenal	  difference	  really	  correspond	  to	  an	  intentional	  dif-­‐
ference,	   in	  the	  sense	  that	  there	  really	   is	  a	  difference	   in	   intentional	  content	  for	  the	  dif-­‐
ferent	  seeing-­‐as	  experiences	  involved	  in	  alternatively	  grasping	  one	  and	  the	  same	  ambig-­‐
uous	  figure,	  in	  a	  nutshell:	  are	  such	  experiences	  different	  experiences	  of?	  
So-­‐called	  anti-­‐intentionalists	  negatively	  answer	  this	  question:	  at	  least	  in	  some	  cases,	  
no	  intentional	  difference	  match	  the	  phenomenological	  difference	  at	  stake	  (cf.	  Peacocke	  
[1983];	  Macpherson	  [2006];	  Nickel	  [2007]).	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  intentionalists	  give	  a	  pos-­‐
itive	   answer	   to	   that	   question.	  Weak	   intentionalists	   limit	   themselves	   to	   say	   that	   there	  
just	  is	  a	  correspondence,	  a	  mere	  co-­‐variation,	  between	  the	  phenomenology	  and	  the	  in-­‐
tentionality	   of	   a	   seeing-­‐as	   experience:	   no	   difference	   in	   the	   phenomenology	  without	   a	  
difference	   in	   the	   intentionality	  of	  such	  an	  experience.	  Strong	   intentionalists	   rather	   say	  
that	  such	  a	  correspondence	   is	  an	   identity:	   the	  difference	   in	  phenomenal	  character	  be-­‐
tween	  two	  seeing-­‐as	  experiences	  of	  the	  same	  figure	  is	  utterly	  captured	  by	  their	  having	  a	  
different	   intentional	   content1.	   Yet	   independently	  of	   the	  distinction	  between	  weak	  and	  
strong	   intentionalism,	   the	   intentionalist	   approach	   has	   been	  modulated	   in	   two	   further	  
	  
1	  For	  this	  difference,	  cf.	  Crane	  (2001):	  83-­‐85.	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ways.	  According	  to	  conceptual	  intentionalists,	  the	  intentional	  content	  of	  a	  seeing-­‐as	  ex-­‐
perience	   is	  conceptual:	  different	  concepts	  constitute	   the	  different	   intentional	  contents	  
mobilized	   by	   different	   seeing-­‐as	   experiences	   of	   an	   ambiguous	   figure2.	  Non-­‐conceptual	  
intentionalists	  rather	  think	  that	  the	  content	  of	  a	  seeing-­‐as	  experience	  whose	  phenome-­‐
nal	   character	   either	   supervenes	   on	   or	   is	   identical	   with	   it	   is	   non-­‐conceptual,	   it	   is	   not	  
made	   of	   concepts	   (cf.	   Jagnow	   [2011];	   Orlandi	   [2011];	   Peacocke	   [1992];	   Raftopoulos	  
[2009;	  2011];	  Tye	  [1995])3.	  	  
Yet	   intentionalists	   may	   develop	   a	   further	   theoretical	   possibility	   that	   combines	   the	  
above	  two	  ones.	  Some	  seeing-­‐as	  experiences	  have	  a	  phenomenal	  character	  that	  is	  mere-­‐
ly	  matched	  by	  a	  non-­‐conceptual	  intentional	  content,	  while	  some	  other	  seeing-­‐as	  experi-­‐
ences	   have	   a	   phenomenal	   character	   that	   is	   also	  matched	   by	   a	   conceptual	   intentional	  
content.	  In	  what	  follows,	  I	  will	  positively	  explore	  this	  possibility,	  by	  attempting	  to	  show	  
that	   it	   is	  grounded	   in	   the	   fact	   that,	  unlike	   the	   former	  seeing-­‐as	  experiences,	   the	   latter	  
seeing-­‐as	   experiences	   are	   pictorial	   experiences.	   In	   other	   terms,	   the	   experiences	   that	  
concern	  an	  ambiguous	  figure	  in	  the	  latter	  case	  are	  of	  the	  same	  kind	  as	  the	  experiences	  
we	  entertain	  when	  we	  perceive	  pictures,	  both	  simple	  pictorial	  representations	  like	  ordi-­‐
nary	  snapshots	  and	  childish	  sketches	  and	  complex	  pictorial	  representations	  like	  drawing	  
and	  paintings;	  with	   respect	   to	   the	   involved	   figure,	  we	   simply	   redouble	   the	  experience	  
that	  in	  pictorial	  cases	  normally,	  but	  not	  always,	  is	  just	  a	  single	  one.	  More	  precisely,	  in	  a	  
normal	  pictorial	  experience,	   in	  seeing	   the	  material	  object	  she	   faces,	   the	  perceiver	  also	  
has	  an	  experience	  of	  another	  something	  that	  is	  not	  there.	  Whereas	  in	  such	  seeing-­‐as	  ex-­‐
periences,	  in	  again	  seeing	  the	  material	  object	  she	  faces,	  the	  perceiver	  also	  has	  different	  
experiences	  of	  some	  different	  somethings	  that	  are	  not	  there.	   In	  this	  respect,	  when	  we	  
see	  an	  ambiguous	  figure	  such	  as	  the	  famous	  Jastrow’s	  duck-­‐rabbit	  figure,	  we	  are	  in	  the	  
very	  same	  predicament	  as	  when	  we	  see	  an	  ambiguous	  painting,	  like	  e.g.	  an	  Arcimboldo’s	  
	  
2	   Traditionally,	   conceptual	   intentionalism	   is	   ascribed	   to	  Wittgenstein	   (20094).	   In	   point	   of	   fact,	  
many	  quotations	  by	  Wittgenstein	  as	  regards	  the	  perception	  of	  ambiguous	  figures	  go	  in	  this	  direc-­‐
tion:	  e.g.,	  «So	  we	  interpret	  it,	  and	  see	  it	  as	  we	  interpret	  it»	  ([20094]:	  §	  116),	  «the	  lighting	  up	  of	  an	  
aspect	  seems	  half	  visual	  experience,	  half	  thought»	  ([20094]:	  §	  140).	  Yet	  as	  we	  will	  see	  later,	  Witt-­‐
genstein’s	  actual	  position	   is	  more	  articulated	  and	  closer	  to	  the	  position	  I	  will	  here	  defend.	  Con-­‐
ceptual	  intentionalism,	  moreover,	  is	  defended	  by	  those	  who	  espouse	  a	  theory-­‐laden	  conception	  
of	  perception	  or,	  which	  actually	  amounts	  to	  the	  same	  thing,	  believe	  in	  strong	  cognitive	  penetra-­‐
bility	  with	  respect	   to	  perception	   in	  general,	   the	   idea	  that	  perception	  has	  a	  conceptual	  content.	  
For	  a	  recent	  defense	  of	  this	  idea,	  cf.	  Churchland	  (1989).	  	  
3	  Although	  Nanay	  (2010;	  2011)	  does	  not	  explicitly	  label	  his	  position	  as	  non-­‐conceptualist,	  it	  natu-­‐
rally	  falls	  under	  non-­‐conceptualism.	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painting,	   in	  which	  we	   reduplicate	   the	  kind	  of	  experience	  we	  entertain	  when	  we	  enjoy	  
Leonardo’s	  Mona	  Lisa	  or	  Velazques’	  Las	  Meninas;	  that	  is,	  we	  have	  two	  pictorial	  experi-­‐
ences	  of	  one	  and	  the	  same	  figure.	  Thus,	  we	  see	  the	  Jastrow	  figure	  either	  as	  a	  duck	  or	  as	  
a	  rabbit	  pretty	  much	  in	  the	  same	  sense	  as	  we	  see	  an	  Arcimboldo’s	  painting	  either	  as	  a	  
human	   being	   or	   a	   set	   of	   fruits	   and	   vegetables.	   Let	  me	   therefore	   consider	   the	   second	  
kind	  of	  seeing-­‐as	  experiences	  as	  experiences	  of	  ambiguous	  pictures.	  	  
The	  architecture	  of	  this	  paper	  will	  be	  the	  following.	  Firstly	  (section	  2),	  I	  will	  hold	  that	  
there	   are	   some	   seeing-­‐as	   experiences	   that	   merely	   have	   a	   non-­‐conceptual	   intentional	  
content;	   namely,	   those	   experiences	   involving	   merely	   two-­‐dimensional	   ambiguous	   fig-­‐
ures:	  experiences	  of	  organizational	  seeing-­‐as.	  Secondly	  (section	  3),	  I	  will	  focus	  on	  other	  
seeing-­‐as	  experiences	  of	  two-­‐dimensional	  ambiguous	  figures	  that	  however	  also	  prompt	  
an	  experiential	  grasping	  of	  the	  third	  dimension.	  I	  will	  treat	  those	  experiences	  as	  pictorial	  
experiences	  of	  ambiguous	  pictorial	   representations.	  As	   to	  pictorial	  experiences	   in	  gen-­‐
eral,	  I	  will	  share	  Wollheim’s	  (19802)	  idea	  that	  such	  experiences	  have	  a	  complex	  phenom-­‐
enology	  of	  a	  sui	  generis	  twofold	  experience	  that	  is	  matched	  by	  a	  two-­‐tiered	  intentional	  
content.	  Yet	  I	  will	  further	  analyze	  what	  the	  folds	  of	  such	  an	  experience	  are	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  
fold	  of	  organizational	  seeing-­‐as	  and	  a	  fold	  of	  knowingly	  illusory	  seeing-­‐as,	  by	  also	  ascrib-­‐
ing	  them	  a	  non-­‐conceptual	  and	  a	  conceptual	  content	  respectively.	  This	  will	  enable	  me	  to	  
treat	   those	   other	   overall	   seeing-­‐as	   experiences	   as	   pictorial	   experiences	   of	   ambiguous	  
pictorial	   representations	   that	   are	   endowed	  with	   the	   above	   different	   two-­‐tiered	   inten-­‐
tional	  contents.	  Furthermore,	  I	  will	  briefly	  investigate	  the	  consequences	  of	  such	  a	  posi-­‐
tion	  as	  to	  the	  debate	  on	  the	  so-­‐called	  cognitive	  penetrability	  of	  perception	  (section	  4).	  
After	  having	  considered	  an	  objection	  to	  this	  treatment	  of	  seeing-­‐as	  experiences	  of	  am-­‐
biguous	  pictures	  (section	  5),	   I	  will	   finally	  try	  to	  show	  (section	  6)	  how	  this	  overall	   treat-­‐
ment	  of	   seeing-­‐as	  experiences	  has	  been	  anticipated	   in	   the	   later	  Ludwig	  Wittgenstein’s	  
reflections	  on	  this	  issue.	  
Before	  starting,	  a	  caveat.	  By	  defending	  the	   intentionalist	   idea	  that	  seeing-­‐as	  experi-­‐
ences	  have	  an	  intentional	  content,	  either	  conceptual	  or	  non-­‐conceptual,	  matching	  their	  
phenomenology,	   I	  do	  not	  want	  to	  defend	  intentionalism	  in	  general.	  So	   in	  the	  end	  I	  am	  
neither	  a	   strong	  nor	  a	  weak	   intentionalist.	   I	   indeed	  believe	   that	  as	  a	  general	   thesis	  on	  
qualitative	  states	   intentionalism	  fails,	   for	   there	  are	  qualitative	  states	  –	  notably,	   intero-­‐	  
or	   proprio-­‐ceptive	   sensations	   and	   moods	   –	   whose	   qualitative	   properties	   are	   not	  
matched	  at	  all	  by	  intentional	  ones	  (cf.	  Voltolini	  [2013]).	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2.	  Organizational	  Seeing-­‐As	  Experiences	  
Let	  me	  start	  by	  considering	  different	  seeing-­‐as	  experiences	  of	  an	  ambiguous	  merely	  two-­‐
dimensional	  figure,	  that	  is,	  a	  figure	  that	  merely	  involves	  different	  two-­‐dimensional	  per-­‐
ceptual	  interpretations.	  The	  prototype	  of	  such	  experiences	  is	  the	  one	  concerning	  the	  so-­‐
called	  Mach	  figure,	  namely	  the	  figure	  that	  can	  be	  seen	  either	  as	  a	  diamond	  or	  as	  a	  tilted	  
square.	  
	  
To	  my	  mind,	  there	  is	  no	  doubt	  that	  the	  two	  experiences	  here	  involved	  have	  a	  differ-­‐
ent	  phenomenology.	  (Some	  admit	  that,	  at	  least	  in	  some	  cases,	  this	  is	  questionable4.	  This	  
sounds	  rather	  incredible	  to	  me	  –	  I	  clearly	  entertain	  a	  phenomenal	  switch	  in	  grasping	  the	  
different	  aspects	  of	  the	  figure.	  Yet	  even	  if	  this	  were	  really	  the	  case,	  it	  would	  merely	  in-­‐
volve	   a	   problem	  with	   the	   example	   –	   just	   change	   the	   example	   and	   consider	   a	   case	   in	  
which	  one	  and	  the	  same	  array	  of	  dots	  can	  be	  seen	  either	  conforming	  to	  a	  vertical	  or	  a	  to	  
a	  horizontal	  organization)5.	  
	  
	  
Now,	  as	  many	  have	  maintained,	   this	  different	  phenomenology	   is	  matched	  by	  a	  dif-­‐
ference	   in	   their	   intentional	   content.	  Criticisms	   to	   this	   claim	   (cf.	  Peacocke	   [1983];	  Mac-­‐
pherson	   [2006];	   Nickel	   [2007])	  merely	   work	   as	   criticisms	   to	   improper	   formulations	   of	  
what	   such	   a	   content	   really	   amounts	   to.	   To	  my	  mind,	   there	   indeed	   is	   a	   proposal	   as	   to	  
	  
4	  As	  both	  Jagnow	  ([2011]:	  333)	  and	  Raftopoulos	  ([2011]:	  507,	  511)	  seem	  to	  allow.	  
5	   On	   behalf	   of	   the	   anti-­‐intentionalist,	   one	   such	   further	   example	   is	   put	   forward	   by	   Peacocke	  
(1983):	  25-­‐26.	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what	  this	  intentional	  content	  consists	  in	  that	  resists	  all	  such	  criticisms:	  such	  experiences	  
mobilize	   in	   their	   content	   different	   grouping	   properties	   of	   the	   involved	   figure.	   These	  
properties	  are	  the	  different	  ways	  for	  the	  figure’s	  elements	  of	  being	  arranged	  according	  
to	  different	  orientations6.	  Let	  me	  therefore	  say	  that	  the	  two	  different	  seeing-­‐as	  experi-­‐
ences	  that	  concern	  a	  merely	  two-­‐dimensional	  figure	  are	  different	  experiences	  of	  organi-­‐
zational	  seeing-­‐as.	  In	  the	  Mach	  figure,	  one	  can	  group	  its	  array	  in	  a	  certain	  way,	  along	  a	  
certain	  orientational	  axis	  –	  the	  one	  actually	  following	  the	  angles’	  bisection	  –	  so	  that	  the	  
organizational	  seeing	  of	  the	  figure	  as	  a	  diamond	  arises.	  Yet	  one	  can	  group	  its	  array	  also	  
in	  another	  way,	  along	  another	  orientational	  axis	  –	  the	  one	  actually	  following	  the	  sides’	  
bisection	  –	  so	  that	  the	  organizational	  seeing	  of	  the	  figure	  as	  a	  square	  arises7.	  	  
Anti-­‐intentionalists	  would	  immediately	  wonder	  which	  kind	  of	  properties	  these	  group-­‐
ing	  properties	  are	  (cf.	  Nickel	  [2007]:	  286).	  Well,	  the	  different	  ways	  of	  grouping	  one	  and	  
the	  same	  perceived	  figure	  are	  different	  objective	  properties,	  i.e.,	  different	  properties	  of	  
such	  a	  figure.	  Yet	  they	  are	  orientation-­‐dependent	  properties.	  Change	  the	  external	  frame	  
of	   reference	   that	   allows	   a	   certain	   orientation	   of	   the	   figure’s	   elements,	   and	   you	   will	  
change	   the	   way	   of	   grouping	   the	   figure.	   This	   dependence	  makes	   it	   the	   case	   that,	   alt-­‐
hough	   they	   are	   compatible	  properties	  –	   the	   figure	  possesses	   all	   such	  ways	   for	   its	   ele-­‐
ments	   to	  be	  arranged	  –	  no	  experience	  mobilizes	  both	  properties	  at	  one	  and	   the	  same	  
time8.	   To	   be	   sure,	   one	   might	   suppose	   that	   orientation-­‐dependence	   makes	   grouping	  
properties	  subjective	  properties,	  i.e.,	  properties	  of	  the	  experience	  rather	  than	  of	  what	  is	  
experienced.	  Yet	  orientation-­‐dependence	  occurs	   in	  a	  geometrical,	  not	   in	  an	  egological	  
space,	  characterized	  by	  subjective	  perspectives	  to	  be	  described	  in	  a	  language	  using	  per-­‐
spectival	  locutions	  (“on	  the	  left	  of	  /	  on	  the	  right	  of”,	  “on	  the	  top	  of	  /	  on	  the	  bottom	  of”	  
	  
6	  In	  the	  tradition	  following	  von	  Ehrenfels	  (1988),	  these	  properties	  are	  labelled	  Gestalt	  qualities.	  
7	  By	  such	  orientational	  axes	  I	  don’t	  mean	  symmetry	  axes.	  As	  Macpherson	  ([2006]:	  103-­‐105)	  right-­‐
ly	  notices,	  both	  focusing	  on	  a	  certain	  symmetry	  axis	  rather	  than	  on	  another	  one	  prompts	  no	  phe-­‐
nomenal	   switch	   and	  phenomenal	   switches	   also	   occur	   as	   to	   non-­‐symmetric	   figures	   like	   the	   dis-­‐
torted	  square	  –	  kite	  figure	  I	  will	  immediately	  talk	  about	  below.	  
8	  This	  point	  faces	  another	  criticism	  by	  Macpherson	  ([2006]:	  103)	  against	  ascribing	  such	  seeing-­‐as	  
experiences	   intentional	   contents	   respectively	   made	   of	   compatible	   properties	   understood	   in	  
terms	  of	   symmetry	   axes.	   For	   a	   similar	  point	   against	  Macpherson,	   see	  Raftopoulos	   (2011):	   508.	  
Moreover,	  since	  such	  grouping	  properties	  are	  compatible	  properties,	  they	  are	  co-­‐instantiated	  by	  
an	  ambiguous	  figure	  in	  all	  possible	  worlds	  in	  which	  they	  are	  instantiated	  (provided	  the	  figure	  re-­‐
tains	  its	  shape	  identity).	  Yet	  as	  Nickel	  ([2007]:	  285)	  acknowledges,	  by	  itself	  this	  is	  not	  a	  problem	  
for	  intentionalism	  insofar	  as	  intentional	  content	  can	  well	  be	  more	  fine-­‐grained	  than	  propositions	  
qua	  sets	  of	  possible	  worlds.	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…).	   So,	   even	   though	   they	   are	   dependence-­‐involving	   properties	   as	  much	   as	   subjective	  
properties	  are,	  grouping	  properties	  are	  not	  subjective	  properties9.	  	  
In	  order	  to	  grasp	  this	  difference,	  suppose	  for	   instance	  to	  draw	  an	  ambiguous	  figure	  
such	   as	   the	   distorted	   square	   –	   kite	   figure	   on	   a	   transparent	   vehicle	   such	   as	   a	  window	  
pane	  and	  imagine	  to	  see	  it	  from	  both	  sides,	  i.e.,	  both	  from	  a	  front	  and	  from	  a	  back	  side.	  
Now,	  if	  the	  different	  ways	  of	  seeing	  the	  figure,	  the	  “kitish”	  and	  the	  “squarish”	  ones,	  oc-­‐
curred	   basically	   by	   grouping	   its	   dots	   either	   in	   a	   upleft-­‐to-­‐downright	   sense	   or	   in	   a	  
downleft-­‐to-­‐upright	   sense	  when	   one	   frontally	   sees	   the	   figure,	   one	  would	   have	   to	   say	  
that	  when	  one	  saw	  the	  figure	  from	  the	  other	  side,	  further	  different	  ways	  would	  emerge	  
by	  grouping	  the	  figure’s	  dots	  in	  a	  downright-­‐to-­‐upleft	  sense	  and	  in	  a	  downright-­‐to-­‐upleft	  
sense	  when	  one	  saw	  the	  figure	  from	  the	  other	  side.	  Yet	  in	  point	  of	  fact	  from	  both	  sides	  
there	  simply	  are	   two	  same	  ways	  of	  grouping	   the	   figure,	  directionally	  arranged	  along	  a	  
cardinal	   frame	  of	   reference	   (say,	   an	  east-­‐to-­‐west	  way	   rather	   than	  a	  west-­‐to-­‐east	  way)	  
rather	   than	   an	   egological	   frame	   of	   reference.	   The	   different	   perspectival	   characteriza-­‐
tions	  simply	  are	  different	  approximate	  descriptions	  of	  one	  and	  the	  same	  cardinal	  way	  of	  
grouping	   the	   figure.	   So,	   the	  different	  perspectives	  notwithstanding,	   there	  are	   just	   two	  
ways	  of	  grouping	  the	  figure	  prompting	  exactly	  the	  very	  same	  different	  seeing-­‐as	  experi-­‐
ences.	   Likewise,	  although	   they	  depend	  on	  different	  cardinal	  orientations,	   the	  different	  




9	  For	  a	  similar	  difference	  between	  dependence-­‐involving	  properties,	  see	  Newall	  (2011):	  67.	  Nickel	  
([2007]:	  298)	  criticizes	  an	  intentionalist	  recourse	  to	  subjective	  properties	  for	  it	  allows	  only	  a	  non-­‐
reductive	   intentionalist	  account,	   that	   is,	  an	  account	   that	   traces	  back	  phenomenal	  properties	   to	  
an	  intentional	  content	  that	  still	  appeals	  to	  phenomenal	  properties.	  To	  be	  sure,	  some	  people	  (e.g.	  
Chalmers	   [2004];	  Siewert	   [2004])	  have	  no	  qualms	  with	  non-­‐reductive	   intentionalism.	  Neverthe-­‐
less,	   since	   grouping	   properties	   are	   not	   subjective	   properties,	   this	   criticism	   does	   not	   apply	   to	  
them.	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In	  this	  respect,	   it	   is	  correct	  to	  remark	  that	  as	  to	  the	  Mach	  figure,	  what	  prompts	  the	  
phenomenal	  switch	  from	  seeing	  the	  figure	  as	  a	  diamond	  to	  seeing	  it	  as	  a	  square	  it	  is	  not	  
passing	  to	  see	  the	  figure	  as	  tilted,	  i.e.,	  as	  perspectively	  oriented	  in	  a	  certain	  way	  with	  re-­‐
spect	  to	  the	  perceiver10.	  	  
If	  grouping	  properties	  must	  be	  objective,	  however,	  one	  might	  wonder	  whether	  they	  
have	  to	  depend	  on	  external	  frames	  of	  reference,	  as	  I	  have	  just	  maintained,	  or	  rather	  on	  
object-­‐centered	   frames,	   coinciding	   with	   some	   intrinsic	   axes	   or	   other	   of	   the	   figure	  
(Jagnow	  [2011]:	  336-­‐338).	  Yet	  I	  believe	  that	  object-­‐reference	  frames	  must	  yield	  way	  to	  
external	  frames.	  	  
On	  behalf	  of	   the	  objectualist,	  one	  might	   remark	   that,	   if	   instead	  of	   taking	   the	  Mach	  
figure,	  which	  we	  see	  either	  as	  a	  diamond	  or	  as	  a	  tilted	  square,	  we	  took	  a	  normal	  square,	  
which	  we	  can	  however	  well	   see	  not	  only	  as	  a	  square	  but	  also	  as	  a	   tilted	  diamond,	   the	  
very	  same	  cardinal	  orientation	  (say,	  a	  north-­‐to-­‐south	  orientation)	  would	  prompt	  differ-­‐
ent	   seeing-­‐as	  experiences	  of	   the	   two	   figures	   respectively	   (say,	  a	  “diamondish”	   	  experi-­‐
ence	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  Mach	  figure	  and	  a	  “squarish”	  experience	  in	  the	  case	  of	  a	  normal	  
square).	  So,	  according	   to	   this	   remark,	  external	   frames	  of	   reference	  cannot	  account	   for	  
the	  difference	  in	  phenomenal	  character	  among	  seeing-­‐as	  experiences	  (ibid.).	  	  
Truly	   enough,	   in	   such	   a	   predicament	   one	   and	   the	   same	   cardinal	   order	   would	   cor-­‐
rispond,	  say,	  both	  to	  the	  “diamondish”	  experience	  of	  the	  Mach	  figure	  and	  to	  the	  “squar-­‐
ish”	  experience	  of	  the	  normal	  square.	  Yet	  one	  must	  recall	   that	  grouping	  operations	  al-­‐
ways	  occur	  after	  that	  one	  has	  grasped	  more	  basic	  visual	  features	  of	  a	  figure.	  These	  are	  
the	   features	   of	   a	   figure	   that	   remain	   constant	   in	   a	   seeing-­‐as	   switch	   that	   concerns	   it:	  
namely,	  its	  colours	  and	  shapes.	  In	  our	  case,	  there	  is	  a	  difference	  in	  such	  more	  basic	  visu-­‐
al	  features	  of	  the	  two	  figures	  involved	  that	  makes	  it	  the	  case	  that	  there	  is	  a	  phenomeno-­‐
logical	  difference	  between	  such	  figures	  which	  is	  preliminary	  to	  their	  also	  being	  grouped	  
in	  certain	  ways.	  This	  phenomenological	  difference	   indeed	  depends	  on	  the	  fact	  that	  be-­‐
fore	  their	  being	  somehow	  grouped,	   the	  Mach	  figure	  and	  the	  normal	  square	  are	  differ-­‐
ently	   shaped,	   so	   that	   they	   differently	   parse	   the	   respective	   region	   of	   space.	   In	   other	  
	  
10	  As	  Macpherson	  ([2006]:	  91,	  107-­‐108)	  also	  says,	   insofar	  as	  subjective	  perspectives	  can	  always	  
be	  imposed	  on	  any	  figure,	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  why	  some	  figures	  like	  the	  Mach	  figure	  prompt	  different	  
seeing-­‐as	  experiences,	  respectively	  that	  of	  an	  untilted	  diamond	  and	  that	  of	  a	  tilted	  square,	  while	  
some	  other	   figures	   like	  that	  of	  a	  tilted	  A	  prompt	  no	  such	  difference.	  For	  other	  criticisms	  to	  the	  
idea	  of	  interpreting	  the	  differences	  in	  non-­‐conceptual	  intentional	  content	  of	  seeing-­‐as	  experienc-­‐
es	   in	   terms	  of	  viewpoint-­‐centered	   reference	   frames	  à	   la	  Raftopoulos	   (2009;	  2011),	   see	   Jagnow	  
(2011):	  336-­‐337.	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terms,	  what	  makes	  these	  figures	  phenomenologically	  different	  are	  their	  respective	  fea-­‐
tures	   that	   remain	   perceptually	   constant	   in	   the	   respective	   phenomenal	   switches	   that	  
concern	  such	   figures,	  namely	   their	  different	  shapes.	  Because	  of	   this	  prior	  phenomenal	  
difference	  between	  the	  two	  figures,	  we	  may	  still	  have	  that	  what	  accounts	  for	  the	  seeing-­‐
as	  differences	  that	  affect	  the	  Mach	  figure	  are	  a	  certain	  cardinal	  orientation	  of	  its	  shapes,	  
prompting	  a	  “diamondish”	  seeing-­‐as	  experience	  of	   it,	  and	  another	   cardinal	  orientation	  
of	   its	   shapes,	  prompting	  a	   “squarish”	  experience	  of	   it,	  whereas	  what	  accounts	   for	   the	  
seeing-­‐as	  differences	   that	   affect	   the	   second	   figure,	   the	  normal	   square,	   are	   the	   former	  
cardinal	  orientation	  of	  its	  shapes,	  yet	  prompting	  this	  time	  a	  “squarish”	  seeing-­‐as	  experi-­‐
ence	  of	  it,	  and	  the	  latter	  cardinal	  orientation	  of	  its	  shapes,	  yet	  prompting	  this	  time	  a	  “di-­‐
amondish”	  seeing-­‐as	  experience	  of	  it.	  Or	  so	  I	  claim11.	  
Moreover,	   clearly	   enough	   grasping	   grouping	  properties	   is	   a	  matter	   of	   attention,	   as	  
many	   say12.	   As	   to	   the	   Mach	   figure,	   focusing	   on	   its	   vertices	   favors	   grasping	   the	   “dia-­‐
mond”-­‐	   aspect,	  while	   focusing	  on	   its	   sides	   favors	   grasping	   the	   “square”-­‐	   aspect.	   Yet	   it	  
would	  be	  wrong	  to	  say	  that	  such	  a	  focusing	  is	  a	  form	  of	  spatial	  attention	  spotting	  light	  
on	  some	  points	  of	  the	  figure	  (cf.	  Raftopoulos	  [2009];	  [2011]:	  498-­‐507).	  Even	  though	  one	  
fixes	  a	  point	  in	  that	  figure,	  attentional	  focusing	  amounts	  to	  a	  certain	  overall	  grasping	  of	  
the	   figure13.	   Consider	   an	   ambiguous	   figure	   that	   we	   still	   take	   as	   a	   merely	   two-­‐
dimensional	  figure	  in	  which	  now	  a	  certain	  contour,	  now	  another	  contour	  appears	  visual-­‐
ly	  relevant,	  as	  in	  the	  “tiles”-­‐	  case	  below	  in	  which	  either	  the	  “cross-­‐organized”	  2,	  4,	  6,	  8	  
tiles	  or	  the	  “X-­‐organized”	  1,	  3,	  5,	  7,	  9	  tiles	  visually	  emerges.	  Since	  such	  contours	  overlap,	  
	  
11	  Incidentally,	  this	  shows	  that	  the	  reason	  as	  to	  why	  the	  different	  intentional	  contents	  of	  a	  Mach	  
figure	  do	  not	  amount	  to	  different	  perspectival	  orientations	   is	  not	   that	  seeing	  an	  untilted	   figure	  
and	  seeing	  a	  tilted	  figure,	  say	  an	  A	  and	  a	  tilted	  A,	  have	  no	  phenomenal	  difference	  for	  the	  perceiv-­‐
er.	  (Raftopoulos	  [(2011):	  496]	  critically	  puts	  in	  this	  way	  Macpherson’s	  (2006)	  criticism	  reported	  in	  
footnote	  14.)	   In	   this	   latter	  case	  the	  two	  figures	  at	  stake	  are	   indeed	  differently	  experienced,	   for	  
over	  and	  above	   their	  possibly	  being	   somehow	  grouped,	   they	  are	  differently	   shaped	   figures:	   an	  
A’s	   shape	   occupies	   space	   in	   a	   certain	   two-­‐dimensional	   way,	   while	   a	   tilted	   A’s	   shape	   occupies	  
space	  in	  another	  two-­‐dimensional	  way.	  So	  even	  if	  there	  are	  differences	  in	  intentional	  content	  for	  
the	  experiences	  of	  such	  distinct	  figures,	  they	  are	  irrelevant	  to	  account	  for	  the	  difference	  in	  con-­‐
tent	  of	  the	  different	  seeing-­‐as	  experiences	  of	  one	  and	  the	  same	  ambiguous	  figure	  having	  one	  and	  
the	  same	  shape,	  as	  in	  the	  Mach	  case.	  
12	  From	  Chisholm	  (1993),	  who	  interprets	  Wittgenstein	  in	  this	  respect,	  all	  the	  way	  down	  to	  Nanay	  
(2010;	  2011),	  Orlandi	  ([2011]:	  317)	  and	  Raftopoulos	  ([2009];	  [2011]:	  498-­‐507).	  	  
13	  Many	   attentional	   phenomena	   involving	   grouping	  work	   in	   this	   way,	   as	   pointed	   out	   by	   Block	  
([2010]:	   31-­‐37)	   in	  a	  paper	  actually	  defending	  a	  weak	   intentionalist	  position	  on	   the	   relationship	  
between	  phenomenal	  and	  intentional	  properties.	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the	  switch	  between	  them	  cannot	  refer	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  a	  certain	  area	  of	  the	  figure	  rather	  
than	  another	  one	  is	  spotted14.	  Rather,	   focusing	  on	  certain	  points	  of	  the	  figure	   immedi-­‐
ately	  favors	  a	  certain	  holistic	  grasping	  of	  it,	  while	  focusing	  on	  other	  points	  of	  the	  figure	  
favors	  another	  holistic	  grasping	  of	  it15.	  Likewise,	  once	  you	  fix	  a	  vertex	  of	  the	  Mach	  figure,	  
the	  whole	  figure	  itself	  will	   immediately	  appear	  in	  its	  “diamond”-­‐	  aspect.	  Whereas	  once	  





Let	  us	  stick	  to	  the	  Mach	  figure.	  As	  to	  it,	  it	  is	  correct	  to	  say	  that	  one	  does	  not	  need	  to	  
master	  the	  concepts	  of	  being	  a	  square	  and	  being	  a	  diamond,	  or	  any	  other	  concept	  at	  all,	  
to	  perform	  the	  relevant	  phenomenal	  switch.	  There	  is	  no	  principled	  reason	  as	  to	  why	  no	  
such	  switch	  should	  occur	  for	  a	  perceiver	  if	  she	  did	  not	  possess	  such	  concepts.	  This	  is	  par-­‐
ticularly	  evident	  in	  the	  aforementioned	  “dots”-­‐figure;	  the	  different	  vertical	  and	  horizon-­‐
tal	   perceptual	   arrangements	   corresponding	   to	   the	  phenomenal	   switch	  occurring	   there	  
can	  be	  grasped	  and	  even	  described	  without	  referring	  to	  any	  concept	  at	  all.	  Hence,	  one	  
may	  well	  say	  that	  the	  intentional	  content	  of	  the	  two	  organizational	  seeing-­‐as	  experienc-­‐
es	  of	  one	  and	  the	  same	  ambiguous	  figure	  is	  utterly	  non-­‐conceptual.	  	  
	  
14	  I	  here	  assume	  that	  the	  “tiles”-­‐	  figure	  can	  be	  taken	  as	  a	  merely	  two-­‐dimensional	  figure.	  In	  point	  
of	  fact,	  since	  the	  phenomenal	  switch	  it	  prompts	   is	  naturally	  described	  as	   involving	  different	  fig-­‐
ure-­‐ground	  segmentations,	  it	  is	  more	  natural	  to	  rank	  this	  figure	  with	  the	  cases	  of	  ambiguous	  fig-­‐
ures	   involving	  different	  three-­‐dimensional	   interpretations,	   i.e.	  ambiguous	  pictures,	   I	  will	  discuss	  
below.	  
15	  Cf.	  Jagnow	  (2011):	  342,	  who	  polemizes	  against	  an	  interpretation	  à	  la	  Raftopoulos	  (2009;	  2011)	  
of	  Nanay’s	  (2010)	  position	  on	  this	  matter	  –	  cf.	  again	  (2011):	  338-­‐40	  –	  that	  Nanay	  himself	  (2011)	  
however	  rejects.	  
1	   2	   3	  
4	   5	   6	  
7	   8	   9	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This	  is	  definitely	  not	  a	  new	  idea:	  all	  the	  intentionalists	  hitherto	  quoted	  have	  precisely	  
maintained	  this	  position.	  What	  is	  possibly	  new	  is	  simply	  that	  the	  relevant	  element	  in	  this	  
non-­‐conceptual	  intentional	  content	  is	  made	  by	  grouping	  properties,	  properties	  depend-­‐
ent	  on	  a	  cardinally-­‐framed	  orientation.	  Once	  you	  grasp	  different	  such	  properties,	  a	  dif-­‐
ferent	  organizational	  seeing-­‐as	  experience	  of	  one	  and	  the	  same	  figure	  arises.	  
3.	  Overall	  Seeing-­‐As	  Experiences	  
Yet	   experiences	   that	   concern	   ambiguous	   figures	   like	   the	  Mach	   figure	   are	  not	   the	  only	  
seeing-­‐as	  experiences	  of	  ambiguous	  figures	  that	  there	  are.	  For	  such	  experiences	  involve	  
only	   two-­‐dimensional	   groupings:	   the	   third	   dimension,	   depth,	   is	   not	   involved.	   Depth	  
comes	  in	  whenever	  in	  the	  relevant	  experiential	  groupings	  of	  an	  ambiguous	  figure	  a	  fig-­‐
ure-­‐ground	   segmentation	   emerges,	   which	   is	   not	   the	   case	   as	   regards	   figures	   like	   the	  
Mach	  figure.	   In	  these	  new	  cases,	  while	  contemplating	  an	  ambiguous	  figure	  which	   in	   it-­‐
self	  is	  just	  a	  two-­‐dimensional	  item,	  its	  perceiver	  differently	  groups	  its	  elements	  not	  only	  
along	  height	   and	   length,	   but	   also	   in	   such	  a	  way	   that	   some	  elements	   are	  more	  distant	  
than	   others.	   This	   prototypically	   happens	   in	   the	   case	   of	   the	   “Rubin’s	   vase”-­‐figure,	   in	  
which,	   depending	   on	   the	   ways	   in	   which	   its	   elements	   are	   also	   three-­‐dimensionally	  
grouped,	  one	  sees	  the	  figure	  either	  as	  two	  dark	  faces	  on	  a	  light	  background	  or	  as	  a	  light	  
vase	  on	  a	  dark	  background.	   Yet	   it	   also	  happens,	   though	  perhaps	   less	   evidently,	   in	   the	  
case	  of	  the	  famous	  “duck-­‐rabbit”-­‐Jastrow’s	  figure,	  in	  which	  one	  sees	  the	  figure	  either	  as	  
a	  duck	  (on	  a	  background)	  or	  as	  a	  rabbit	  (on	  a	  background).	  
	  
	   	  
	  
Once	  more,	  there	  is	  no	  doubt	  that	  a	  phenomenal	  switch	  also	  occurs	  in	  these	  cases;	  it	  
is	  one	  thing	  to	  see	  the	  Jastrow	  figure	  as	  a	  duck,	  quite	  another	  thing	  to	  see	  it	  as	  a	  rabbit.	  
One	  should	  not	  be	   led	  astray	  by	   the	   fact	   that,	  before	  and	  after	   the	   switch,	   something	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remains	  constant	  in	  the	  experience	  of	  the	  figure,	  namely	  its	  colors	  and	  shapes16.	  For	  the	  
switch	  is	  phenomenal	  insofar	  as	  the	  groupings	  of	  the	  figure’s	  elements	  change.	  In	  the	  Ja-­‐
strow	   figure,	  one	  basically	  passes	   from	  a	   certain	   “cardinal”	   grouping	   that	   implicitly	   in-­‐
volves	  depth	  as	  well	  (hence	  approximately,	  but	  basically	  improperly,	  described	  as	  a	  per-­‐
spectival	   “left-­‐to-­‐right”	   grouping)	   and	   enables	   one	   to	   grasp	   the	   “rabbit”-­‐aspect	   of	   the	  
figure	  to	  another	  “cardinal”	  grouping	  that	  again	  implicitly	  involves	  depth	  (hence	  approx-­‐
imately,	   but	   basically	   improperly,	   described	   as	   a	   perspectival	   “right-­‐to-­‐left”	   grouping)	  
and	  enables	  one	  to	  grasp	  the	  figure’s	  “duck”-­‐aspect.	  
On	   behalf	   of	   the	   intentionalist,	   one	   might	   think	   that	   these	   three-­‐dimensionally	  
grasped	  ambiguous	  figures	  are	  just	  other	  cases	  of	  the	  same	  predicament	  as	  the	  one	  dis-­‐
played	  by	   figures	   like	   the	  Mach	  one:	   the	  different	   seeing-­‐as	  experiences	   trace	  back	   to	  
two	   different	   non-­‐conceptual	   intentional	   contents,	   captured	   in	   terms	   of	   (admittedly	  
more	   complex)	   different	   grouping	   properties	   (see	   e.g.	   Jagnow	   [2011];	   Orlandi	   [2011];	  
Raftopoulos	  [2009;	  2011])17.	  Yet	  this	  way	  of	  putting	  things	  neglects	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  ex-­‐
periences	  involved	  here	  are	  definitely	  more	  complex	  than	  those	  involved	  in	  the	  previous	  
cases.	  
This	  clearly	   transpires	   if	  one	  notices	   the	   fact	   that,	  unlike	   figures	   like	   the	  Mach	  one,	  
figures	  like	  the	  Jastrow	  figure	  are	  ambiguous	  pictures,	  i.e.,	  two-­‐dimensional	  figures	  that	  
also	  involve	  different	  three-­‐dimensional	  interpretations	  insofar	  as	  they	  pictorially	  repre-­‐
sent	  different	  items	  –	  a	  duck	  and	  a	  rabbit,	  in	  this	  case.	  Accordingly,	  experiences	  of	  these	  
figures	  are	  pictorial	  experiences,	  more	  precisely	  mutiplied	  pictorial	  experiences	   insofar	  
as	  they	  concern	  ambiguous	  pictures:	  they	  replicate	  in	  terms	  of	  different	  pictorial	  experi-­‐
ences	  what	  in	  the	  case	  of	  normal	  pictures	  is	   just	  a	  single	  pictorial	  experience18.	  The	  Ja-­‐
strow	  figure	  is	  both	  a	  picture	  of	  a	  duck	  and	  a	  picture	  of	  a	  rabbit,	  so	  that	  the	  overall	  expe-­‐
rience	  of	  it	  is	  both	  a	  seeing	  of	  it	  as	  a	  picture	  of	  a	  duck	  and	  a	  seeing	  of	  it	  as	  a	  picture	  of	  a	  
	  
16	  As	  Peacocke	  says,	  while	  adding	  that	  in	  such	  a	  case,	  unlike	  the	  case	  of	  the	  so-­‐called	  Necker	  cu-­‐
be,	  the	  phenomenological	  constancy	  is	  matched	  by	  an	  intentional	  constancy	  of	  the	  relevant	  ex-­‐
perience.	  Cf.	  Peacocke	  (1983):	  16-­‐17.	  To	  my	  mind,	  the	  two	  cases	  are	  instead	  quite	  similar.	  In	  both	  
cases	  there	  is	  a	  phenomenal	  difference	  –	  seeing	  the	  Jastrow	  figure	  as	  a	  duck,	  seeing	  it	  as	  a	  rabbit;	  
seeing	  the	  Necker	  cube	  as	  a	  cube	  with	  a	  certain	  front	  face	  and	  another	  back	  face,	  seeing	  it	  as	  a	  
cube	  with	  another	   front	   face	  and	   still	   another	  back	   face	  –	  which	   is	  matched	  by	  an	   intentional,	  
partially	  conceptual,	  difference.	  
17	  Also	  Macpherson	  ([2006]:	  97-­‐98)	  is	  disposed	  to	  provide	  such	  an	  intentionalist	  non-­‐conceptual	  
reading	  for	  these	  cases.	  
18	  At	  least	  superficially;	  as	  Gombrich	  ([1960]:	  249)	  maintained,	  all	  pictures	  are	  inherently	  ambigu-­‐
ous.	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rabbit.	  Now,	  although	  many	  people	  taking	  part	  in	  this	  debate	  have	  noticed	  this	  fact	  (cf.	  
e.g.	   Peacocke	   [1983]:	   17;	   Macpherson	   [2006]:	   97-­‐98),	   its	   consequences	   have	   rather	  
gone	  unnoticed.	  So	  let	  me	  expand	  on	  it.	  
As	  anyone	  knows,	  pictorial	  experiences	  are	  complex	  experiences,	  for	  in	  ne	  such	  expe-­‐
rience	  at	  one	  and	   the	   same	   time	  a	  perceiver	   experiences	   the	   typically	  material	   object	  
she	  faces	  –	  the	  picture’s	  vehicle	  –	  and	  what	  such	  an	  object	  depicts,	  which	  unlike	  the	  ve-­‐
hicle	   is	   not	   there	   –	   the	   picture’s	   subject.	   Richard	  Wollheim	   has	   tried	   to	   capture	   this	  
complexity	  by	  holding	  that	  pictorial	  experiences	  are	  sui	  generis	  experiences,	  experiences	  
of	  seeing	  a	  subject	  in	  a	  vehicle,	  having	  a	  specific	  phenomenology	  that	  is	  expressed	  in	  the	  
experiences’	   twofoldness.	   For	   him,	   a	   seeing-­‐in	   experience	   indeed	   has	   two	   distinct	   yet	  
unseparable	   folds,	   the	   configurational	   fold,	   in	   which	   one	   grasps	   the	   picture’s	   vehicle,	  
and	   the	   recognitional	   fold,	   in	   which	   one	   grasps	   the	   picture’s	   subject	   (cf.	   Wollheim	  
[19802;	  1987;	  1998]).	  
Many	  people	  have	  found	  themselves	  dissatisfied	  with	  this	  proposal	  as	  it	  stands,	  for	  it	  
is	  not	  clear	  what	  those	  folds	  really	  amount	  to	  and	  how	  they	  can	  mix	  together	  if	  they	  are	  
about	  such	  different	  entities	  and	  yet	  the	  seeing-­‐in	  experience	  has	  a	  unitary	  phenomenal	  
character	  (cf.	  respectively	  Lopes	  [1996]:	  50;	  Hopkins	  [2010]:	  167-­‐171).	  Now,	  the	  cases	  of	  
ambiguous	  pictures	  may	  precisely	  help	  one	  to	  give	  an	  answer	  to	  both	  perplexities.	  For	  
the	  different	  seeing-­‐as	  experiences	  of	  an	  ambiguous	  picture	  are	  precisely	  two	  different	  
seeing-­‐in	   experiences,	   to	   be	   treated	   as	   seeing-­‐as	   experiences	  more	   complex	   than	   the	  
previously	  considered	  ones19.	  	  
As	  Wollheim	   himself	   recognizes,	   there	  would	   be	   no	   seeing-­‐in	   experience	   of	   some-­‐
thing	  if	  there	  were	  no	  seeing	  of	  that	  very	  something	  as	  a	  picture	  (cf.	  Wollheim	  [19802]:	  
226).	  Let	  me	  therefore	  consider	  a	  seeing-­‐in	  experience	  the	  same	  as	  the	  overall	  experi-­‐
ence	  of	   something	   as	   a	  picture.	   Since	   in	   the	   case	  of	   ambiguous	  pictures	  we	  have	   two	  
seeing-­‐in	  experiences	  with	  respect	  to	  one	  and	  the	  same	  figure,	  seeing	  a	  figure	  as	  a	  pic-­‐
ture	   here	   splits	   itself	   into	   two	   different	   such	   seeing-­‐as	   experiences,	   to	   be	   further	   un-­‐
packed	  as	  we	  will	  now	  see.	  
On	   the	  one	  hand,	  a	  certain	  overall	   seeing-­‐as	  experience	  of	  an	  ambiguous	  picture	   is	  
similar	   to	  a	   seeing-­‐as	  experience	  of	  an	  ambiguous	  merely	   two-­‐dimensional	   figure:	   it	   is	  
the	  grasping	  of	  a	  certain	  grouping	  of	   the	  pictorial	  vehicle’s	  elements	  that	  also	   involves	  
the	  third	  dimension.	  So,	  such	  an	  overall	  seeing-­‐as	  experience	  is,	  at	  least	  in	  part,	  an	  expe-­‐
rience	  of	  organizational	  seeing-­‐as	  that	  has	  a	  certain	  non-­‐conceptual	  intentional	  content,	  
	  
19	  On	  the	  compatibility	  between	  seeing-­‐in	  and	  seeing-­‐as	  experiences,	  cf.	  Voltolini	  (2012a;	  2012b).	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admittedly	  more	  complex	  that	  the	  one	  of	  a	  seeing-­‐as	  experience	  of	  an	  ambiguous	  figure	  
for	  it	  also	  involves	  arranging	  the	  vehicle’s	  elements	  along	  depth.	  A	  different	  overall	  see-­‐
ing-­‐as	  experience	  of	   the	  same	  picture	  will	   thus	  mobilize	  a	  different	  organizational	  see-­‐
ing-­‐as	  experience,	  hence	  a	  grasping	  of	  a	  different	  grouping	  of	  the	  vehicle’s	  elements	  still	  
involving	  depth,	  hence	  a	  different	  non-­‐intentional	   content.	  Consider	  again	   the	   Jastrow	  
figure.	  One	  may	  see	  the	  figure	  in	  a	  certain	  way,	  by	  grasping	  its	  elements	  in	  a	  “rabbitish”	  
way,	  yet	  one	  may	  also	  see	  the	  figure	  in	  another	  way,	  by	  grasping	  its	  elements	  in	  a	  “duck-­‐
ish”	  way.	  These	  different	  ways	  are	  two	  grouping	  properties	  of	  the	  figure	  mobilized	  in	  the	  
respective	  non-­‐conceptual	  contents	  of	  such	  experiences.	  
Yet	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  precisely	  the	  fact	  that	  such	  graspings	  involve	  the	  third	  dimen-­‐
sion	  has	   an	   import	   that	  phenomenal	   switches	   concerning	  merely	   two-­‐dimensional	   fig-­‐
ures	  lack.	  For	  such	  grasping	  display	  in	  the	  overall	  seeing-­‐as	  experiences	  another	  experi-­‐
ential	   level,	   the	  one	   in	  which	  one	  sees	  the	  ambiguous	  picture	  as	  a	  certain	  thing	   rather	  
than	  as	  another	  one.	  At	  this	  level,	  within	  the	  overall	  seeing-­‐as	  experiences	  of	  an	  ambig-­‐
uous	  picture,	  over	  and	  above	  the	  aforementioned	  different	  organizational	  seeing-­‐as	  ex-­‐
periences,	   one	   has	   further	   different	   seeing-­‐as	   experiences	   whose	   phenomenal	   differ-­‐
ence	  is	  also	  matched	  by	  an	  intentional	  difference.	  In	  the	  first	  of	  these	  further	  experienc-­‐
es,	  one	  sees	  the	  figure	  as	  a	  certain	  something	  (as	  a	  rabbit,	  in	  our	  example),	  while	  in	  the	  
second	   of	   these	   further	   experiences,	   one	   sees	   the	   figure	   as	   another	   something	   (as	   a	  
duck,	   in	   our	   example).	  Now,	   the	   different	   seeing-­‐as	   experiences	   that	   are	  mobilized	   at	  
this	  level	  are	  also	  different	  in	  kind	  from	  the	  different	  organizational	  seeing-­‐as	  experienc-­‐
es	   that	   are	  mobilized	   at	   the	   previous	   level.	   These	   further	   experiences	   do	   not	   indeed	  
mobilize	  grouping	  properties.	  Rather,	   they	  are	  experiences	   in	  which	  utterly	  knowingly,	  
the	  picture’s	  vehicle	  is	  taken	  either	  as	  a	  certain	  thing	  or	  as	  another	  one.	  In	  the	  Jastrow	  
figure,	  for	  example,	  one	  well	  knows	  that	  the	  picture	  is	  neither	  a	  rabbit	  nor	  a	  duck.	  Yet,	  
one	  is	  perceptually	  forced	  to	  take	  it	  either	  as	  a	  rabbit	  or	  as	  a	  duck.	  In	  this	  respect,	  these	  
further	  seeing-­‐as	  experiences	  are	   like	  optical	   illusions	  recognized	  as	  such,	  as	  when	  one	  
goes	  on	  seeing	  an	  oar	  as	  crooked	  even	  if	  one	  well	  knows	  that	  the	  oar	  is	  not	  so	  crooked.	  
Let	  me	  find	  a	  new	  label	  for	  these	  further	  seeing-­‐as	  experiences:	  experiences	  of	  knowing-­‐
ly	  illusory	  seeing-­‐as.	  
I	  can	  now	  say	  that	  it	  is	  somehow	  improper	  in	  the	  pictorial	  case	  to	  take	  these	  two	  see-­‐
ing-­‐as	  experiences	  of	  a	  different	  kind,	  the	  organizational	  seeing-­‐as	  experiences	  and	  the	  
knowingly	  illusory	  seeing-­‐as	  experiences,	  as	  experiences	  per	  se,	   insofar	  as	  they	  contrib-­‐
ute	   to	  constitute	  one	  and	  the	  same	  experience.	  This	   further	  experience	   is	  what	   I	  have	  
labeled	  the	  overall	  seeing-­‐as	  experience	  of	  something	  as	  a	  picture	  that	  Wollheim’s	  see-­‐
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ing-­‐in	  experience	  actually	  amounts	   to	  and	   that	   comes	  doubled	   in	  experiencing	  an	  am-­‐
biguous	  picture.	  In	  point	  of	  fact,	  an	  organizational	  seeing-­‐as	  experience	  and	  a	  knowingly	  
illusory	  seeing-­‐as	  experience	  precisely	  are	  nothing	  but	  the	  different	  aspects	  of	  one	  and	  
the	  same	  experience,	  call	   it	   indifferently	  an	  overall	   seeing-­‐as	  experience	  or	  a	  seeing-­‐in	  
experience,	   encompassing	   them.	   They	   indeed	   are	   what	   Wollheim	   labels,	   as	   we	   have	  
seen,	   the	   configurational	   and	   the	   recognitional	   fold	   of	   a	   twofold	   seeing-­‐in	   experience	  
(see	  again	  Voltolini	  [2012a;	  2012b])20.	  	  
Put	  alternatively,	  we	  have	  found	  what	  those	  folds	  amount	  to:	  the	  first	  one	  is	  an	  expe-­‐
rience	  of	  organizational	  seeing-­‐as	  in	  which	  one	  sees	  an	  item,	  typically	  a	  picture’s	  vehicle,	  
as	  arranged	  in	  a	  certain	  way,	  while	  the	  second	  one	  is	  an	  experience	  of	  knowingly	  illusory	  
seeing-­‐as	  in	  which	  one	  sees	  that	  very	  item	  as	  a	  certain	  something.	  As	  a	  result,	  when	  an	  
ambiguous	  picture	   is	   at	   stake,	  we	  have	   two	  different	   seeing-­‐in	   experiences,	   or	   overall	  
seeing-­‐as	   experiences,	   in	  which	   two	  different	   folds,	   the	   configurational	   fold	  or	   the	  as-­‐
pect	  of	  organizational	  seeing-­‐as	  and	  the	  recognitional	  fold	  or	  the	  aspect	  of	  knowingly	  il-­‐
lusory	   seeing-­‐as,	   are	   respectively	   involved.	  When	   we	   see	   a	   certain	   something	   (say,	   a	  
rabbit)	   in	  an	  ambiguous	  picture,	  or	  we	  see	  that	  picture	  as	  a	  picture	  of	  that	  very	  some-­‐
thing,	  we	  both	  see	  the	  pictorial	  vehicle’s	  elements	  as	  grouped	  in	  a	  certain	  (“rabbitish”)	  
way	  and	  we	  see	  that	  vehicle	  as	  that	  very	  something,	  while	  when	  we	  see	  another	  some-­‐
thing	  (say,	  a	  duck)	  in	  that	  picture,	  or	  we	  see	  that	  picture	  as	  a	  picture	  of	  this	  other	  some-­‐
thing,	   we	   both	   see	   the	   pictorial	   vehicle’s	   elements	   as	   grouped	   in	   another	   (“duckish”)	  
way	  and	  we	  see	  that	  vehicle	  as	  this	  other	  something.	  	  
Moreover,	  it	  is	  now	  clear	  why	  the	  two	  folds	  of	  a	  seeing-­‐in	  experience	  are	  inseparable,	  
as	  Wollheim	  claims.	  For	  the	  first	  fold	  has	  an	  intentional	  content	  on	  which	  the	  content	  of	  
the	   second	   fold	   is	  grounded.	  Take	  again	   the	   Jastrow	   figure.	   It	   is	  because	  one	   sees	   the	  
picture’s	   vehicle	   in	   a	   “rabbitish”	  way,	   by	   properly	   grouping	   its	   elements	   three-­‐dimen-­‐
sionally,	   that	  one	  also	   sees	   it	  as	  a	   rabbit;	   likewise,	   it	   is	  because	  one	  sees	   the	  picture’s	  
vehicle	   in	   a	   “duckish”	   way,	   by	   properly	   re-­‐grouping	   its	   elements	   three-­‐dimensionally,	  
that	  one	  also	  sees	  it	  as	  a	  duck.	  So,	  taken	  as	  an	  overall	  seeing-­‐as	  experience	  of	  something	  
as	  a	  picture,	  a	  seeing-­‐in	  experience	  indeed	  is	  phenomenologically	  unitary.	  For	  its	  overall	  
phenomenal	  content	  supervenes	  on	  its	  overall	  intentional	  content,	  which	  is	  made	  by	  the	  
two	   distinct	   yet	   intertwined	   contents	   of	   its	   folds,	   the	   organizational	   seeing-­‐as	   experi-­‐
ence	  of	  the	  picture’s	  vehicle	  and	  the	  knowingly	  illusory	  seeing-­‐as	  experience	  of	  that	  ve-­‐
	  
20	  The	  idea	  of	  treating	  the	  recognitional	  fold	  in	  terms	  of	  what	  I	  here	  call	  a	  knowingly	  illusory	  see-­‐
ing-­‐as	  experience	  originally	  comes	  from	  Levinson	  (1998).	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hicle.	  Hence	  whenever	  an	  ambiguous	  picture	   is	  at	   stake,	  one	  simply	  has	   two	  seeing-­‐in	  
experiences,	   or	   overall	   seeing-­‐as	   experiences,	   that	   respectively	   supervene	   on	   the	   dis-­‐
tinct	  overall	  intentional	  contents	  of	  such	  experiences,	  which	  again	  are	  respectively	  made	  
by	  the	  two	  respective	  distinct	  yet	  intertwined	  contents	  of	  those	  experiences’	  folds.	  	  
This	  account	  of	  ambiguous	  pictures	  thus	  shows	  that	  intentionalism	  is	  saved	  not	  only	  
with	   respect	   to	   merely	   two-­‐dimensional	   figures,	   but	   also	   with	   respect	   to	   two-­‐
dimensional	  pictures	  leading	  to	  three-­‐dimensional	  experiences.	  As	  we	  have	  indeed	  just	  
seen,	  the	  two	  overall	  seeing-­‐as	  experiences	  of	  one	  and	  the	  same	  ambiguous	  picture	  dif-­‐
fer	   insofar	  as	  they	  have	  different	   intentional	  contents	  that	  come	  out	  of	  the	  interaction	  
between	  the	  intentional	  contents	  of	  their	  respective	  configurational	  folds	  (their	  respec-­‐
tive	  organizational	  seeing-­‐as	  experiences)	  and	  the	   intentional	  contents	  of	   their	   respec-­‐
tive	  recognitional	  folds	  (their	  respective	  knowingly	  illusory	  seeing-­‐as	  experiences).	  
But	  which	   kind	  of	   content	   is	   the	  one	   that	   figures	   in	   the	   recognitional	   fold	   partially	  
constituting	  an	  overall	   pictorial	   experience?	   Insofar	   as	   that	   fold	   is	   a	   knowingly	   illusory	  
seeing-­‐as,	   it	   involves	   the	   so-­‐called	   report	   awareness,	   the	   kind	   of	   awareness	   needed	  
when	  one	  has	   to	   recognize	   that	  one	  and	   the	   same	  object	   is	   given	   twice	   to	  her.	  When	  
such	   an	   awareness	   is	   at	   play,	   the	   content	   of	   an	   experience	   affected	  by	   it	   can	  only	   be	  
conceptual21.	  So,	  the	  different	  intentional	  contents	  of	  two	  overall	  seeing-­‐as	  experiences	  
of	  one	  and	  the	  same	  ambiguous	  picture	  are	  partially	  conceptual.	  For,	  while	  the	  contents	  
of	  their	  configurational	  folds	  are	  still	  non-­‐conceptual,	  the	  contents	  of	  their	  recognitional	  
folds	  are	  instead	  conceptual.	  
4.	  A	  Short	  Detour	  on	  Cognitive	  Penetrability	  
If	  what	  I	  have	  just	  said	  is	  correct,	  it	  has	  some	  bearings	  as	  to	  the	  issue	  of	  whether	  experi-­‐
ences	  are	  cognitively	  penetrable.	  Cognitive	  penetrability	  can	  be	  meant	  in	  two	  senses,	  a	  
weaker	  and	  a	  stronger	  one.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  weak	  cognitive	  penetrability	  is	  the	  thesis	  
according	  to	  which	  either	  the	  phenomenal	  character	  or	  the	  intentional	  content	  of	  an	  ex-­‐
perience	  are	  permeable	  by	  states	  of	  their	  subjects’	  cognitive	  systems,	  hence	  by	  the	  con-­‐
cepts	   that	   constitute	   the	   intentional	   content	   of	   such	   states	   (cf.	   Macpherson	   [2012]).	  
Seeing-­‐as	  experiences	  of	  the	  former	  kind,	  the	  mere	  organizational	  seeing-­‐as	  experiences	  
involving	  merely	  two-­‐dimensional	  figures,	  are	  cognitively	  penetrable	  in	  this	  weak	  sense.	  
	  
21	  As	  Raftopoulos	  ([2009]:	  148,	  156)	  acknowledges.	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As	   I	   have	   said,	   the	   intentional	   content	   of	   such	   experiences	   is	   non-­‐conceptual.	   In	   such	  
cases,	  one	  can	  indeed	  entertain	  a	  phenomenal	  switch	  even	  if	  one	  has	  no	  mastery	  of	  the	  
relevant	  concepts.	  Nevertheless,	  concepts	  may	  well	  affect	  the	  phenomenal	  characters	  of	  
such	  experiences,	  insofar	  as	  they	  may	  well	  activate	  attention	  in	  performing	  the	  grouping	  
job	  that	  prompts	  the	  different	  experiences	  involved22.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  strong	  cogni-­‐
tive	  penetrability	   is	   the	  thesis	  according	  to	  which	  the	   intentional	  content	  of	  an	  experi-­‐
ence	  is	  permeable	  by	  states	  of	  their	  subjects’	  cognitive	  systems,	  hence	  by	  the	  concepts	  
that	  constitute	  the	   intentional	  content	  of	  such	  states.	  Seeing-­‐as	  experiences	  of	   the	  se-­‐
cond	   kind,	   overall	   seeing-­‐as	   experiences	   involving	   ambiguous	   pictures,	   are	   cognitively	  
penetrable	   in	   this	   strong	   sense.	   For,	   as	  we	  have	   seen,	   they	   involve	   a	   layer	   of	   content	  
which	  is	  conceptual,	  the	  one	  corresponding	  to	  their	  recognitional	  fold.	  	  
People	  who	  deny	  that	  perception	  of	  ordinary	  objects	  is	  conceptual	  standardly	  distin-­‐
guish	  between	  early	  vision,	  which	  enables	  a	  perceiver	  to	  individuate	  an	  object	  in	  her	  sur-­‐
roundings,	  and	   late	  vision,	  which	  enables	   the	  perceiver	   to	   reidentify	   the	  object	  as	  one	  
and	  the	  same	  entity	  at	  different	  times.	  Insofar	  as	  this	  is	  the	  case,	  they	  say,	  early	  vision	  is	  
non-­‐conceptual	   while	   late	   vision	   is	   conceptual.	   However,	   they	   further	   claim,	   only	   the	  
former	  kind	  of	  vision	   is	  genuinely	  perceptual,	   is	  a	  way	  of	  perceptually	  grasping	  the	  ob-­‐
jects	  out	  there;	  the	  latter	  is	  just	  a	  matter	  of	  interpretation	  of	  the	  perceptual	  data.	  This	  is	  
why,	   they	   comment,	   perception	   is	   cognitively	   impenetrable	   (cf.	   e.g.	   Pylyshyn	   [2003];	  
Raftopoulos	  [2009]).	  
Yet	   if	   a	   pictorial	   experience	  works	   in	   terms	   of	   an	   overall	   seeing-­‐as	   experience	   as	   I	  
have	  here	  maintained,	  this	  way	  of	  putting	  things	  cannot	  hold	  of	  it.	  For	  in	  a	  pictorial	  ex-­‐
perience	  so	  conceived,	  early	  vision	  is	  completely	  exhausted	  by	  the	  organizational	  seeing-­‐
as	  fold	  of	  that	  experience,	  which	  admittedly	  is	  non-­‐conceptual	  in	  its	  intentional	  content.	  
If	  early	  vision	  can	  be	  unpacked	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  primary	  sketch,	  in	  which	  basically	  the	  per-­‐
ceived	  objects’	   contours	   are	   grasped,	   and	  of	   a	   2½D	   sketch,	   in	  which	  depth	  hence	  dis-­‐
tance	   relations	   among	   the	  perceived	  objects	   are	   grasped23,	   then	   such	   an	  unpacking	   is	  
precisely	  what	  takes	  place	   in	  the	  organizational	  seeing-­‐as	  fold	  of	  a	  pictorial	  experience	  
conceived	  as	  an	  overall	  seeing-­‐as	  experience.	  In	  such	  a	  fold	  all	  such	  features	  of	  the	  pic-­‐
ture’s	   vehicle,	  which	  as	   such	   is	   just	   an	  object	   among	  many	  other	  objects,	   are	   grasped	  
qua	   its	  grouping	  properties.	  Yet	  if	  that	  pictorial	  experience	  so	  conceived	  is	  really	  a	  per-­‐
ception	  although	  a	  sui	  generis	  one	  as	  Wollheim	  claims	  by	  treating	  it	  as	  a	  twofold	  seeing-­‐
	  
22	  I	  have	  defended	  this	  thesis	  in	  Voltolini	  (2011).	  
23	  As	  Raftopoulos	  ([2009]:	  272-­‐274)	  claims	  on	  behalf	  of	  Marr	  (1980).	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in	   experience,	   its	   perceptual	   character	   is	   not	   absorbed	   by	   its	   organizational	   seeing-­‐as	  
fold;	   its	   knowingly	   illusory	   seeing-­‐as	   fold	   is	   genuinely	   perceptual	   as	  well24.	   Yet,	   as	  we	  
have	  seen,	  this	   latter	  fold	   is	  conceptual	   in	   its	   intentional	  content.	  By	  being	  conceptual,	  
this	  fold	  is	  a	  case	  of	  late	  vision.	  Yet	  since	  it	  contributes	  to	  the	  perceptual	  character	  of	  the	  
pictorial	  experience	  so	  conceived,	  at	  least	  in	  such	  a	  case	  late	  vision	  utterly	  contributes	  to	  
perception;	  hence,	  perception	  in	  the	  case	  of	  a	  pictorial	  experience	  so	  conceived	  is	  cogni-­‐
tively	  penetrable	   in	   the	  strong	  sense,	   that	   is,	   concepts	   figure	   in	   the	  overall	   intentional	  
content	  of	  such	  a	  state.	  
5.	  An	  Objection	  and	  a	  Reply	  
One	  might	  still	  wonder	  whether	  an	  overall	  seeing-­‐as	  experience	  made	  by	  two	  typologi-­‐
cally	  distinct	  seeing-­‐as	  folds,	  as	  to	  my	  mind	  a	  pictorial	  experience	  of	  seeing-­‐in	  amounts	  
to,	   has	   to	   have	   an	   intentional	   content	   that	   is	   at	   least	   partially	   conceptual.	   As	   regards	  
ambiguous	  merely	  two-­‐dimensional	  figures,	   I	  have	  admitted	  before	  that	  one	  who	  mas-­‐
ters	  e.g.	  neither	  the	  concept	  of	  being	  a	  diamond	  nor	  the	  concept	  of	  being	  a	  square	  can	  
entertain	   the	   relevant	   phenomenal	   switch	   concerning	   the	   ambiguous	  Mach	   figure.	   In	  
fact,	  I	  have	  said,	  the	  intentional	  content	  of	  the	  relevant	  organizational	  seeing-­‐as	  experi-­‐
ences	  there	  is	  non-­‐conceptual.	  Yet,	  one	  might	  wonder,	  is	  it	  not	  the	  same	  in	  the	  case	  of	  
ambiguous	  pictures:	  as	  to	  e.g.	   the	  Jastrow	  figure,	  cannot	  one	  who	  masters	  neither	  the	  
concept	  of	  being	  a	  duck	  nor	   the	  concept	  of	  being	  a	   rabbit	  entertain	   the	   relevant	  phe-­‐
nomenal	   switch?	  And	   if	   this	   is	   the	  case,	  does	  not	   this	   show	   that	   the	  content	  of	  either	  
seeing-­‐as	  experience	  is	  utterly	  non-­‐conceptual,	  it	  is	  at	  most	  described	  or	  interpreted	  as	  
conceptual?	  (Cf.	  again	  Raftopoulos	  [2009;	  2011]	  and	  Macpherson	  herself	  [2006]:	  95).	  
First	   of	   all,	   one	  might	   retort	   that	   empirical	   evidence	   goes	   against	   this	   hypothesis:	  
children	  less	  than	  four-­‐years-­‐old	  who	  do	  not	  possess	  the	  relevant	  concepts	  are	  enable	  to	  
entertain	  the	  switches	  concerning	  an	  ambiguous	  figure	  (cf.	  Gopnik,	  Rosati	  [2001];	  see	  al-­‐
so	  Leopold,	  Logothetis	  [1999])25.	  Yet	  even	  if	  contrary	  to	  such	  an	  evidence	  it	  turned	  out	  
	  
24	  As	  even	  non-­‐conceptualists	  would	  admit	  if	  the	  knowingly	  illusory	  seeing-­‐as	  were	  not	  a	  fold	  of	  
an	  overall	  experience	  but	  it	  completely	  characterized	  an	  experience,	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  optical	  illu-­‐
sions.	  Optical	  illusions	  are	  actually	  the	  examples	  Fodor	  (1983)	  invokes	  in	  order	  to	  prove	  the	  mod-­‐
ular	  character	  of	  ordinary	  perception.	  
25	  To	  be	  sure,	  the	  non-­‐conceptual	  intentionalist	  may	  reply	  to	  this	  that	  even	  if	  possession	  of	  such	  
concepts	   is	  required	  to	  entertain	  the	  phenomenal	  switch,	   it	   is	  not	  sufficient	   in	  order	  for	  the	   in-­‐
tentional	   content	   of	   the	   relevant	   seeing-­‐as	   experiences	   to	   be	   conceptual.	   Although	   concepts	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that	   individuals	  without	   such	  a	  mastery	   are	  able	   to	  perform	   the	   relevant	  phenomenal	  
switch26,	  this	  would	  only	  prove	  that	  the	  conceptual	  content	  an	  overall	  seeing-­‐as	  experi-­‐
ence	  is	  less	  fine-­‐grained	  than	  we	  expected:	  it	  has	  to	  be	  accounted	  for	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  cer-­‐
tain	  conceptual	  disjunction	  rather	  than	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  single	  concept.	  
In	   this	   respect,	   it	   is	   interesting	   to	   note	   that	   as	   regards	   an	   ambiguous	   picture,	   just	  
some	   concept	   prompts	   the	   relevant	   phenomenal	   switch.	   Consider	   once	   again	   the	   Ja-­‐
strow	  figure	  and	  suppose	  you	  see	   it	  as	  a	  duck.	   If	  you	  saw	  it	  as	  a	  goose,	  you	  would	  still	  
have	  the	  same	  experience.	  You	  have	  to	  see	   it	  e.g.	  as	  a	  rabbit	   to	  entertain	  the	  relevant	  
phenomenal	  switch.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  suppose	  you	  see	  the	  figure	  precisely	  as	  a	  rabbit,	  
by	  therefore	  having	  another	  seeing-­‐as	  experience	  concerning	  it.	  If	  you	  saw	  it	  as	  a	  hare,	  
you	  would	  still	  have	  the	  same	  experience.	  You	  have	  to	  see	  it	  e.g.	  as	  a	  duck	  to	  entertain	  
the	  relevant	  phenomenal	  switch.	  
A	  non-­‐conceptualist	  may	  say	  that	  this	  fact	  shows	  that	  a	  certain	  overall	  seeing-­‐as	  ex-­‐
perience	  has	  no	  conceptual	   intentional	  content	   for	   it	   is	  an	  experience	  that	   it	   is	  merely	  
conceptually	  interpreted	  in	  a	  certain	  way27.	  But	  this	  is	  not	  what	  this	  fact	  shows.	  Rather,	  
it	  simply	  shows	  that	  there	  are	  limits	  to	  the	  interpretation:	  in	  one	  way	  of	  seeing	  the	  am-­‐
biguous	  picture,	  one	  can	  appropriately	  interpret	  the	  picture	  according	  to	  different	  con-­‐
cepts,	  yet	  all	  these	  concepts	  have	  to	  be	  compatible	  with	  a	  certain	  phenomenal	  character	  
of	  the	  picture’s	  experience.	  Other	  concepts	  appear	  to	  be	  appropriate	  only	  once	  the	  ex-­‐
perience	  has	  a	  different	  phenomenal	  character,	   it	  becomes	  an	  utterly	  different	  overall	  
seeing-­‐as	  experience.	  Now,	  this	  predicament	  can	  be	  accounted	  for	  by	  saying	  that	   in	   its	  
knowingly	  illusory	  seeing-­‐as	  fold,	  a	  certain	  overall	  seeing-­‐as	  experience	  has	  a	  conceptual	  
intentional	   content	   whose	   extension	   is	   broader	   than	   what	   one	   originally	   supposed;	  
namely,	  an	  extension	  that	  coincides	  with	  that	  of	  the	  disjunction	  of	  the	  concepts	  that	  are	  
mobilized	  in	  the	  appropriate	  interpretations.	  
	  
prompt	  the	  switch,	  they	  do	  not	  figure	  as	  constituents	  of	  the	  contents	  of	  such	  experiences,	  which	  
remain	  non-­‐conceptual	  (in	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  previous	  Section,	  ambiguous	  pictures	  as	  well	  as	  am-­‐
biguous	  figures	  would	  thus	  support	  at	  most	  weak,	  but	  not	  strong,	  cognitive	  penetrability).	  Cf.	  Tye	  
(1995):	  140.	  I	  however	  think	  that	  this	  reply	  is	  ruled	  out	  by	  what	  I	  previously	  said:	  pictorial	  experi-­‐
ences	  are	  unlike	  experiences	  of	  merely	   two-­‐dimensional	   figures	   in	   that	   they	  have	  recognitional	  
folds,	  hence	  if	  they	  mobilize	  concepts	  these	  figure	  within	  the	  intentional	  contents	  of	  such	  folds.	  
For	  other	  criticisms	  to	  Tye’s	  point	  of	  view,	  cf.	  Orlandi	  (2011):	  312.	  
26	  Perhaps	  such	  an	  evidence	  is	  not	  so	  decisive,	  as	  Macpherson	  ([2006]:	  95,	  note	  35)	  claims.	  
27	  As	  again	  Raftopoulos	  (2009;	  2011)	  claims	  among	  others.	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So,	  we	  should	  not	  properly	  say	  that	  a	  certain	  overall	  seeing-­‐as	  experience	  of	  e.g.	  the	  
Jastrow	  figure	  phenomenally	  is	  the	  experience	  it	  is	  independently	  of	  whether	  it	  is	  inter-­‐
preted	  either	   as	   the	   seeing	  of	   the	   figure	   as	   a	   duck	  or	   as	   the	   seeing	  of	   the	   figure	   as	   a	  
goose.	  Rather,	  we	  should	  say	  that	  such	  a	  seeing-­‐as	  experience	  phenomenally	  is	  the	  phe-­‐
nomenal	  experience	   it	   is	   insofar	  as	   in	   its	  knowingly	   illusory	  fold,	   it	   is	   the	  experience	  of	  
seeing	  the	  figure	  as	  an	  anatid	  (i.e.,	  either	  as	  a	  duck	  or	  as	  a	  goose).	  Likewise,	  we	  should	  
not	  properly	  say	  that	  another	  overall	  seeing-­‐as	  experience	  of	  the	  same	  figure	  phenome-­‐
nally	  is	  the	  experience	  it	  is	  independently	  of	  whether	  it	  is	  interpreted	  either	  as	  the	  see-­‐
ing	  of	  the	  figure	  as	  a	  rabbit	  or	  as	  the	  seeing	  of	  the	  figure	  as	  a	  hare.	  Rather,	  we	  should	  
say	   that	  such	  a	  seeing-­‐as	  experience	  phenomenally	   is	   the	  phenomenal	  experience	   it	   is	  
insofar	  as	  in	  its	  knowingly	  illusory	  fold,	  it	  is	  the	  experience	  of	  seeing	  the	  figure	  as	  a	  lepo-­‐
rid	  (i.e.,	  either	  as	  a	  rabbit	  or	  as	  a	  hare).	  
One	  must	  here	  not	  be	  led	  astray	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  intentional	  content	  of	  the	  pic-­‐
ture	  –	  in	  one	  of	  its	  interpretations,	  if	  it	  is	  an	  ambiguous	  picture	  –	  has	  a	  narrower	  exten-­‐
sion	  than	  the	  conceptual	   intentional	  content	  of	   the	  knowingly	   illusory	   fold	  of	   the	  rele-­‐
vant	   overall	   seeing-­‐as	   experience	   that	   concerns	   such	   a	   picture.	   For	   such	   a	   content	   is	  
what	  turns	  out	  of	  a	  negotiation	  that	   fixes	  what,	  among	  all	   things	  that	  one	  can	  see	  the	  
picture	  as,	  is	  the	  content	  of	  that	  picture,	  what	  that	  picture	  is	  of	  –	  again,	  if	  it	  is	  an	  ambig-­‐
uous	  picture,	  in	  one	  of	  its	  interpretations.	  
For	  instance,	  with	  respect	  to	  one	   interpretation	  of	  the	  following	  ambiguous	  picture,	  
in	  the	  knowingly	  illusory	  fold	  of	  a	  certain	  overall	  seeing-­‐as	  experience	  concerning	  it	  one	  
can	  see	  it	  either	  as	  Lenin	  or	  as	  Gengis	  Khan	  or	  as	  many	  other	  moustached	  human	  males,	  
insofar	  as	  one	  can	  generically	  see	  it	  as	  a	  moustached	  human	  male.	  Yet	  in	  this	  interpreta-­‐
tion	  it	  is	  only	  a	  picture	  of	  Lenin,	  for	  this	  is	  one	  way	  the	  picture	  has	  been	  officially	  meant.	  
While	   with	   respect	   to	   another	   interpretation	   of	   that	   pic-­‐
ture,	   in	  the	  knowingly	   illusory	  fold	  of	  another	  overall	  see-­‐
ing-­‐as	  experience	  concerning	  it	  one	  can	  see	  it	  pretty	  much	  
in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  if	  she	  looked	  at	  it	  from	  standing	  above	  
it;	   that	   is,	   either	   as	   Che	   Guevara	   or	   as	   the	   Italian	   ex-­‐
comedian	  Beppe	  Grillo	  or	   as	  many	  other	  bearded	  human	  
males,	   insofar	   as	   one	   can	   generically	   see	   it	   as	   a	   bearded	  
human	  male.	  Yet	   in	   this	   interpretation	   it	   is	  only	  a	  picture	  
of	  Che,	  for	  this	  is	  another	  way	  the	  picture	  has	  been	  official-­‐
ly	  meant	  (see	  Voltolini	  [2012a]:	  183-­‐186).	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6.	  Wittgenstein	  as	  a	  Precursor	  of	  the	  Present	  Ideas	  
All	  in	  all,	  therefore,	  we	  have	  two	  different	  kinds	  of	  seeing-­‐as	  experiences,	  a	  mere	  expe-­‐
rience	  of	  organizational	  seeing-­‐as	  that	  affects	  merely	  two-­‐dimensional	  figures	  whose	  in-­‐
tentional	  content	  is	  non-­‐conceptual	  and	  an	  overall	  seeing-­‐as	  experience	  that	  affects	  pic-­‐
tures,	   i.e.,	   two-­‐dimensional	   figures	   endowed	   with	   a	   three-­‐dimensional	   interpretation,	  
i.e.,	  an	  experience	  of	   seeing	  a	   figure	  as	  a	  picture	  of	   something.	   In	   its	   turn,	   this	  overall	  
seeing-­‐as	  experience	   is	  Wollheim’s	  analyzed	  seeing-­‐in	  experience.	   It	   is	   indeed	  made	  of	  
two	   intertwined	   yet	   typologically	   different	   experiential	   folds,	   a	   fold	   again	   of	   organiza-­‐
tional	   seeing-­‐as	   whose	   intentional	   content	   is	   again	   non-­‐conceptual	   and	   another	   fold	  
grounded	  on	  the	  previous	  one,	  a	  fold	  of	  knowingly	  illusory	  seeing-­‐as,	  whose	  intentional	  
content	  however	  is	  conceptual.	  
Now,	   although	   Wittgenstein	   is	   generally	   interpreted	   as	   the	   main	   defender	   of	   the	  
conceptualist	  intentionalist	  position,	  his	  ideas	  on	  seeing-­‐as	  experiences	  are	  more	  articu-­‐
lated.	   In	   point	   of	   fact,	   he	   somehow	   captured	   the	   above	   distinction	   between	   different	  
types	  of	  seeing-­‐as	  experiences	  when	  he	  drew	  an	  analogous	  distinction	  between	  optical	  
and	  conceptual	  aspects28.	  For	  Wittgenstein,	  first	  of	  all,	  optical	  aspects	  are	  characterized	  
by	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  phenomenal	  switch	  they	  mobilize	  between	  different	  seeing-­‐as	  expe-­‐
riences	   of	   one	   and	   the	   same	   figure	   occurs	   automatically;	  while	   as	   regards	   conceptual	  
aspects,	  one	  such	  switch	  is	  subject	  to	  one’s	  will.	  Moreover,	  an	  optical	  aspect	  is	  mobilized	  
precisely	  when	  one	  merely	  sees	  a	  two-­‐dimensional	  figure	  in	  a	  certain	  way	  (rather	  than	  in	  
another	   one),	  while	   a	   conceptual	   aspect	   is	  mobilized	  when,	   in	   virtue	  of	   seeing	   a	   two-­‐
dimensional	  figure,	  one	  sees	  it	  as	  a	  three-­‐dimensional	  item	  (or	  as	  another	  one)	  (cf.	  Witt-­‐
genstein	  [1980]:	  I,	  §§	  970,	  1017).	  It	  is	  only	  in	  the	  second	  case	  that	  the	  relevant	  seeing-­‐as	  
experience	   has	   a	   conceptual	   intentional	   content;	   in	  
the	   first	   case,	  we	   can	   conjecture	   (although	  Wittgen-­‐
stein	   does	   not	   put	   it	   in	   these	   terms)	   that	   its	   inten-­‐
tional	  content	   is	  merely	  non-­‐conceptual.	  Finally,	  one	  
and	  the	  same	  figure	  can	  be	   the	  object	  of	  both	  kinds	  
of	  experiences.	  This	  is	  the	  case	  of	  the	  so-­‐called	  “dou-­‐
ble	  cross”-­‐figure.	  	  
One	  may	  well	  pass	  from	  seeing	  the	  above	  figure	  as	  
a	   white	   cross	   on	   a	   black	   background	   to	   seeing	   that	  
	  
28	  As	  Peacocke	  ([1983]:	  25,	  note	  27)	  originally	  underlined. 
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figure	  as	  a	  black	  cross	  on	  a	  white	  background.	  Yet	  one	  may	  also	  pass	  from	  merely	  seeing	  
a	  two-­‐dimensional	  black	  figure	  (call	  it	  a	  two-­‐dimensional	  black	  cross	  if	  you	  like)	  flanked	  
as	   it	   were	   by	   a	   white	   two-­‐dimensional	   array	   of	   triangles	   to	   merely	   seeing	   a	   two-­‐
dimensional	  white	  figure	  (call	   it	  a	  two-­‐dimensional	  white	  cross	   if	  you	  like)	  flanked	  as	   it	  
were	  by	  a	  black	  two-­‐dimensional	  array	  of	  triangles.	  In	  this	  “two-­‐dimensional”	  stance	  to	  
the	   figure,	   we	   have	   a	   switch	   between	   different	   organizational	   seeing-­‐as	   experiences	  
(whose	   intentional	   content	   is,	  we	  may	  add,	  non-­‐conceptual).	   To	  be	   sure,	  Wittgenstein	  
does	  not	  even	  say	  that	  in	  the	  previous	  “three-­‐dimensional”	  stance	  to	  the	  figure,	  one	  has	  
distinct	  overall	   seeing-­‐as	  experiences	  made	  by	  two	  folds	  whose	  content	   is	   respectively	  
non-­‐conceptual	   and	   conceptual.	   Yet	   he	   clearly	  means	   that	   that	   only	   in	   such	   a	   stance	  
concepts	  are	   involved	   in	  the	   intentional	  contents	  of	   the	  two	  relevant	  seeing-­‐as	  experi-­‐
ences.	  As	  he	  puts	  it:	  
Those	  two	  aspects	  of	  the	  double	  cross	  (I	  shall	  call	  them	  A	  aspects)	  might	  be	  reported	  simply	  
by	  pointing	  alternately	  to	  a	  free-­‐standing	  white	  and	  a	  free-­‐standing	  black	  cross.	  
Indeed,	  one	  could	  imagine	  this	  as	  a	  primitive	  reaction	  in	  a	  child,	  even	  before	  he	  could	  talk.	  
[…].	  
The	  A	  aspects	  are	  not	  essentially	  three-­‐dimensional;	  a	  black	  cross	  on	  a	  white	  ground	  is	  not	  
essentially	   a	   cross	  with	   a	  white	   surface	   in	   the	   background.	  One	   could	   teach	   someone	   the	  
idea	  of	  the	  black	  cross	  on	  a	  ground	  of	  different	  colour	  without	  showing	  him	  anything	  other	  
than	  crosses	  painted	  on	  sheets	  of	  paper.	  Here	  the	  “background”	  is	  simply	  the	  surrounding	  of	  
the	  cross.	  (Wittgenstein	  [20094]:	  II	  xi,	  §§	  215,	  218).	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